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Public Seminar
on
Japan’s New Security Policy and Regional Response in Southeast Asia
Thursday, February 18th, 2016
Universitas Indonesia, Depok
Organized by
ASEAN Study Center, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Indonesia
Background
The Japanese government just issued the country’s new security policy in September 2015. Two points can be highlighted from this new policy, that is the level of domestic public debate taking place in Japan and the response from Japan’s neighboring countries during and after its legislation process. In regards to the first point, history actually shows that the debate on security policy in Japan is hardly new. Debates on Japan’s security policy have taken place least for around twenty-five years, since the Gulf War. What makes the recent debate quite different compared to those in the past is the intensity of public debate that takes in Japan. In the past, discussions on Japan’s security policy were conducted in a limited sphere confined mainly to experts on the field. Now, the scope of discussions has expanded way beyond the small circle of security experts, now it has even reached the general public.
The widening discussion on Japan’s new security policy occurs due to at least three inherent reasons. The first reason relates to the proposed reinterpretation of the Constitution regarding the right of collective self-defense by the cabinet decision of July 1, 2015. Concerning the right of collective self-defense, the key phrase of constitutional interpretation since the 1980s has been whether or not the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) operations exceed “the use of force to the minimum extent necessary.” In this regard, the ongoing debate concerns whether the exercise of the right of individual self-defense has been understood to be consistent with the notion of the “use of force to the minimum extent necessary for self-defense” and thus not contradicting the Constitution. On the other hand, the right of collective self-defense has been judged to be incompatible with the Constitution as it exceeds that scope.
The second reason is related to the question of whether or not Japan will exercise the right of collective self-defense in contingency since principles and criteria through which policy decisions could be made to remain absent. To date, there is still lack of clarity regarding the series of policy proposals, specifically on points related to principles and criteria through which policy decisions regarding collective self-defense should be made although those proposals correspondingly call for exercising it.
The last reason concerns the question of necessity. In the 1990s, discussions on the legal basis of security were how to provide support for the US forces operating in the contingencies, such as a conflict in the Korean Peninsula. In the 2000s, the main issue was how Japan should contribute to the global “War on Terror.” In the 2010s, it can be argued that the question revolved around how deterrence of the US-Japan alliance in general can be strengthened. Unlike in the 1990s, however, most of Japan’s security problems in the current security environment are not necessarily related to the exercise of the right of collective self-defense. Thus being said, there are those who claim that it is not really necessary for Japan to discuss this issue at the present time.
Needless to say, opinions in Japan are divided regarding the above aspects. The arguments in favor of the new security policy can be summarized as follows: (1) in the changing security environment, a change in interpretation of the constitution is essential to tackle the fundamental issues of the legal basis of security; (2) interpretation of the Constitution has changed over time, and what the government is proposing is within a rational scope and still consistent with the Constitution; and (3) it would be even more inappropriate to expand the scope of the right of individual self-defense. On the other hand, the arguments against the new policy can be summarized as follows: (1) a change in interpretation would undermine the very foundation of Japan as a peaceful nation; (2) the change in the interpretation of the Constitution contradicts the position of past governments and goes beyond the permissible scope for reinterpretation, revising the Constitution itself would be needed for this change to be allowed; (3) there is basically no clear need for a change in interpretation and Japan can address any security threat it faces by the right of individual self-defense; and (4) while the government argues that the exercise of the right of collective self-defense would be “limited,” how it will be limited remains unclear and there is a possibility that uncontrolled expansion will take place during its exercise.
Equally needless to argue, Japan’s new security policy has attracted attention from its neighboring countries, especially from those coming in from the Southeast Asian region. Geography wise, Japan’s policy shift will have serious ramifications for Southeast Asia given Japan’s reliance on sea-lines-of communication (SLOCs) in the region for its trade and energy security. Japan’s reliance on open and unfettered access to SLOCs in particular, are mirrored in key documents such as the country’s National Defense Program, Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, and the explanatory note on the ‘Cabinet Decision on Development on Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People’. With this new security policy and the country’s quest for free access to SLOCs altogether might take form in the (re)emergence of a ‘can-do’ and ‘will-do’ Japan under Abe administration.
Furthermore, Abe’s explicit desire to push Japan into using its considerable weight to play a significant role in upholding and protecting the existing order is beyond the ambition of any previous Japanese administration in the post-war period. Japan has traditionally relied on economic and ‘soft power’ diplomacy and eschewed strategic and military approaches to addressing problems beyond its immediate environments. The point must also be made that Abe’s determination to go beyond mere emphasis on protecting national sovereignty and inextricably and explicitly tie Japan’s more ‘proactive role’ to issues of upholding and protecting regional order goes beyond any position taken by his post-war predecessors.
In the last few years, Abe’s administration has pushed Japan’s into playing a more proactive role in Southeast Asia. For instance, the prime minister pledged to “offer [Japan’s] utmost support for efforts by ASEAN member countries to ensure security of the seas and skies and rigorously maintain freedom of navigation and over-flight” in his keynote speech at the 2014 Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore. The speech highlighted Japan’s decision to help enhance the maritime capabilities of Southeast Asian states. For example, Japan decided to provide new patrol vessels to the Philippines Coast Guard, to provide aid to Indonesia so the country can procure three new patrol vessels, and to offer technical skills and training in Coast Guard operations to officials in the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam. Undoubtedly, such moves would provide opportunities for the Southeast Asian states but also concomitantly cause a degree of concern in the region.
Opportunities for and concerns from Southeast Asia states would arise from the possibility of Japan playing a strategic role in the region which may take three forms, namely military involvement in Southeast Asian conflicts, military technology transfer, as well as multilateral and others diplomatic initiatives. In regards to the possibility of Japanese military being involved in Southeast Asian conflicts, Japanese Defense Minister Gen. Nakatano stated that Japan might one day consider contributing to America-led naval patrols in the South China Sea in February 2015. This comment, among others, has caused speculation that under the cover of Abe’s ‘proactive contribution to peace and security’ and specific actions such as the government’s reinterpretation of the Constitution to allow ‘collective security’, the SDF will be used to join conflicts in Southeast Asia. On the other hand, however, Japan proactive security role in Southeast Asia would lead to the intensifying military technology transfers from the country to the region. This is an opportunity that would significantly benefit Southeast Asia states due to their existing strategic gap: the countries’ defense capability is inadequate to meet actual security challenges.
Significance
A more active Japan military involvement and its increasing security assistance in the region consequently would multiply Japanese influence in the field of multilateral and other diplomatic initiatives vis-à-vis Southeast Asian states. Today, one might argue that Japan is not that powerful to the point where it can unilaterally shape or veto a multilateral entity or agenda pursued by such an entity, but powerful enough in the sense that offering its acquiescence is vital to the success and viability of that multilateral process or institution. For this reason, no plausible multilateral process or institution with region-wide impact can exclude Japan, and would find it difficult to gain regional traction without overt Japanese support. The prospect of Japan’s proactive role in the region, however, might alter the current pattern of Japan – Southeast Asia relations with divided possibilities. On one side, Japan’s proactive role means bigger and stronger back-up for Southeast Asia’s multilateral (read: Association of Southeast Asian Nations/ASEAN) initiative(s) in the regional and global arena. On the flip side of this, however, Japan’s proactive role might also hinder the leverage of ASEANin the same arena due to the increasing level of Japanese global influence under the Abe administration.
Event and Objectives
To sum up, the possibility of Japan playing a more proactive role as a result of the shift in its security policy has attracted attention on an unprecedented scale, both from its domestic public to its neighboring countries in Southeast Asia. On the one hand, some perceive this shift as possibly producing tangible benefits. However, on the other hand, there some others who are concerned with this shift. Against this backdrop, the ASEAN Study Center at the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Indonesia believes that it isimportant to publicly discuss the current domestic and regional development in regards to Japan’s new security policy. Opinions and insights on this security policy might derive from Japanese and Indonesian diplomats and/or academia. For that reason, the ASEAN Study Center at the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences,Universitas Indonesia proposes to facilitate a forum that can accommodate those needs in hopes of producing a comprehensive and thorough assessment concerning the topic at hand.
In the ” Public Seminar on Japan’s New Security Policy and Regional Response in Southeast Asia”, the ASEAN Study Center at the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences,Universitas Indonesia will conduct an event as a forum to answer questions, clarify rumors, and disseminate information regarding Japan’s current and future security interests along with its impacts for Southeast Asia.
Throughthis event, the ASEAN Study Center aims: (1) to encourage a better understanding of Japan’s new security policy, especially for relevant practitioners and experts in Indonesia and Southeast Asia, and (2) to provide a forum for the wider public to gain a broader perspective on Japan’s security policy; how the policy might influence international politics in Southeast Asia region, and what role the Japanese might play concretely in regards to the aforementioned. To be specific, participants for this seminar are: universities in Jabodetabek, ASEAN Study Center in Jabodetabek, Government Institutions (Coordinating Ministry of Politics, Law and Security; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, the Military Headquarters, the State Intelligence Agency, Commission I DPR RI), ASEAN Secretariat, CSIS Jakarta, LIPI, Embassy of Asia Pacific and South Asia Countries (China, South and North Korea, Taiwan, ASEAN Countries, Timor Leste, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, the US, Canada, Australia).
Speakers
For this purpose, we will presents following distinguishes speakers:
1. Prof. Dr. Satoru Mori
Prof. Mori is a professor at the Department of Global Politics in the Faculty of Law, Hosei University – Tokyo. In this seminar, Prof. Mori will deliver a speech on various aspects of the Japanese new security policy.
2. Prof. Dr. Hikmahanto Juwana
Prof. Hikmahanto is a professor in international politics in the Faculty of Law, the University of Indonesia. In this seminar, Prof. Hikmahanto will present his analytical assessment on the reliability of the existing international and/or multilateral arrangements in regards to the newly announced Japanese security policy.
3. H.E. Mr. Edi Yusup.
Mr. Edi Yusup is the Director of East Asia and Pacific Affairs at the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this seminar, Mr. Edi Yusup will present the Indonesia point of view concerning Japan’s new security policy, both as a sovereign state, as a Southeast Asian State, as well as a member of ASEAN.